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While the relationship between language and philosophy was an issue 
that concerned Nietzsche throughout his writings, the degree with which 
this concern was expressed varied. While there is an explicit articulation 
of this relationship in the early writings, the later oncs amy refer to it 
infrequently. Among the texts on language from the early writings is On 
the Origin of LanKlloge (1869-1870), I which antedates the better-known 
On Trllth and Lie in (111 Extra-Moral Sen;, (1873). There arc evident 
incellectual differences between these tWO works on language but what 
is striking is the obvious fascination with Kant in rhe first and the 
diminution of this innllcnce in the later text. 
In this paper, I shall examine the aforememioned 011 the O"igm 01 
Langllage, a text thac , despite belonging to one of the most productive 
periods of Nietzsche's life, has raised little imerest in the discussions 
concerning Nietzsche's theory of language. One notable exception is the 
work of Claudia Crawford who, in Tbe Begim';'lg! 01 NietZJche'j Theory 01 
Lallgllage/ painstakingly craces the background influences of Hartmann, 
Schopenhauer, Kane, and Gerber on Nietzsche's views on language. 
Crawford offers a contextual reading that demonstrates both what 
Nietzsche appropriated from his predecessors and what he then 
elaborated upon . Her work traces the genealogical 'nodes' that enable us 
to understand the complexity of Nietzsche's views on language. More 
recently, Christian J. Emden has described in detail the extene of the 
sciemific and philological texts of the lS,h and 19'h century upon 
Nietzsche's writings arguing that with an understanding of these 
background influences, Nietzsche is nOt the radical thinker that many 
have pictured him (0 be.' 
In 011 the Origm 01 ulIIgliage, Nietzsche offers an analysis of language 
that is framed within the nature-culture OPPOSItion. On reading this 
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paper, ir is fairly obvious chac rhe terms in this opposition are not simply 
opposed to each other buc rather hierarchically posit ioned, with the 
natural valorised in relation to the cu ltural that, as a result, finds itself in 
a secondary and inferior place. In this paper, I shaU argue chat one of the 
problems with this text is that Nietzsche replicates at a meta-level the 
very criticism of culture that he articulates: while the text valorises the 
natural origin and purpose of language in opposition to the cu ltural 
misuseoflanguage, such a criticism involves a performative contradiction 
insofar as Nietzsche uses the same "cultural" language he is cricical of. 
The valorisation of nature can on ly be conducted from the perspective of 
culture, a perspective chat Nietzsche finds inadequate in the first place. 
Riddles and Gifts 
An interesting contrast can be made between the opening lines of On Iht 
Origm 0/ Langllagt and On Tt"Nlh al/d UtJ in an Extra-moral StttJe. The 
latter opens with the convention typically used in fairy-tales, namely 
~Once upon a time," an opening approp riate to the content of a paper 
that challenges the certainty of human knowledge. Nietzsche's argument 
is that the certainty of knowledge is grounded in the view oflanguage as 
a transparent medium that faithfully rep resellfs the world and which 
therefore all ows for the possibility of certain knowledge. By dispelling 
this view of language Nietzsche concludes that certainty is, in fact, an 
ill usion, a "fairy-tale" needed by the human species to control their 
environment. By way of COntrast, the opening lines of Nietzsche's On Iht 
Origin 0/ Lal/gllage frame the question of the origin of language as a 
ridd le: "(a]n old riddle among the Indians, the Greeks, down to the most 
recent ti mes was: to say with certainty how the origin of language must 
nOI be conceived." (OL 209; KGW 11/2, 18S). But why is the question of 
the origin of language asked in the fo rm of a riddle? 
The opening I,ines indicate thac discovering rhe origin of language is 
nOt going to be a simple task. The origin is here being marked Out as a 
singular moment, an origina1 and unrepeatable beginning that challenges 
any attempt to identify when and where it began. It is perhaps because 
such an origin lies outside or beyond human memory that the question 
of the origin of language can only be framed as a riddle: discovering this 
origin will require a fair amount of mgenuity in much the same way as 
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a riddle is designed to test the ingenuity of the speaker. And the riddle 
of the origin of language is not just one riddle from among the many 
riddles found in any culture, but is universal in that it is asked by 
different peoples (the Indians, the Greeks, to ' the most recent times'). 
This Mold" riddle, it seems, is as old as the origins of language, an 
association that should noc be surprising since it is only with the 
possession of a language that riddles can be articulated: the origins of 
language coincides with the birth of riddles. 
The enduring interest in explaining the origin of language is also 
evidenced in the Genesis narrative of the Old Testament: "The Old 
Testament is the only religious document with a myth about the origin 
of language, or something of the sort." (OL 210; KGW 11/2, 186) The 
Old Testament displaces the search for the origin from the form of the 
riddle to that of mythical narrative, a narrative that is justified on the 
grounds that the origin of language is so distant and enigmatic that any 
attempt to deduce its origin using the tools of logic is futile. And there 
is a further twist in this perennial search for the origin of language: given 
that human existence is inconceivable without language the question 
concerning its origin has also been posed at a secular level : "The nations 
are silent about the origin of language: they cannot imagine the world, 
the gods, and man without language." (OL 210; KGW 11/2, 187) But 
the secular search for the origin oflanguage ends in fai lure: silence is the 
only option and it is revealing that while the human in human existence 
is inescapably entwined with language, no one seems to be able to 
explain where it comes from. 
The inability to explain the origin of language has led to the 
conclusion that the fact of language can only be accounted for in terms 
of divine intervention: it is a "direct gift" from God. The magnitude of 
the gift of language is such that only a supernatural origin can justify its 
existence for, in the economy of gift-exchange, the gift of language is one 
which humanity can never hope to return . Despite being a God-g iven 
gift, the collaboration of humanity is required to ensure its referential 
functioning : uGod and man give things their name, which express each 
thing's relation to man"" (OL 210; KGW 11/2, 186-187). The problem 
with this argumenc is that it presupposes what it wants to argue for: if 
God and humanity already share the same language, i.e., [he possibility 
of mutual (linguistic) communication, then how is this supposed to 
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explain the origin of language? The Biblical narrative on the origin of 
language is similar [Q the naturalist view presented and dismissed in 
Plato's era/ylll!. Language is here understood in terms of naming,) but 
as a theory of language it is inadequate in that it presupposes that the 
world is already meaningfuJiy categorised and waiting to be named. 
Given that the Biblical account of language is untenable, Nietzsche 
rejectS the idea that language can have a divine origin. 
While the attempt [Q explain the "riddle" of language by locating a 
divine origin fails, conventionalism provides another possible explanation 
by identifying the origin orlanguage as the product of human agreement. 
Nietzsche memions twO theorists of language who sustained the 
conventionalist thesis: Mauperruis and Lord Monboddo. Maupertuls 
(1698·1 n9) claimed that "gestures and shrieks" lie at the origin of 
language but these are insufficient for explaining language as a medium 
for communication since they all remain at a very broad subjective level. 
As Nietzsche rightly pointS Out, "Not everyone is skilled at correct: 
intonation and precise hearing." (OL 210; KGW H/2, 186) 
Lord Monboddo (1714-1799) is described as a "writer of importance" 
who argued against rhe idea that rhere was an original and founding 
language, a "primeval language," from which all others have been 
derived. Humanity has frequently invented languages so that the search 
for the origin of language, rather than designating a singular moment, 
rums out to be a repetitive event. Ultimately, however, while this 
explains away the singular event that marks the origin of language, it 
seems that Lord Monboddo wasn' t satisfied with his own theory, writing 
about it "for twenty one years." The archetype conventionalist finds that 
conventionalism is unable to pinpoint the origin of language within the 
human realm: "he [Monboddo] still must resort to superhuman help: the 
Egyptian demon-kings."(OL 211; KGW 11/2, 187) Given the inadequacy 
of divine and secular explanations (or the origin o(Janguage. what other 
possibility remains? 
Instinct 
For Nietzsche, the only way of explaining the origin of language is by 
shifting emphasis away from a search that identifies language in terms of 
its origins diachronica11y to one that locates I[ as a feature operating at a 
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synchronic level, i.e., instinctively. Language is the instinctive and 
natural feature of humanity that is described in terms of motherhood and 
ch ildbirth . Nietzsche applauds Herder who uses the figure ohhe mother 
to dramatise the necessity oflanguage for humanity: as babies must leave 
the womb of their mother at the right lime, chi ldren must learn their 
language at the right time. Bmh childbirth and language acquisition are 
instinctive and these two spheres of human exjstence belong to the same 
order of being: "man was born for language." (OL 21t; KGW 11/2, 187) 
Human life is the cause of which language is the effect. 
Given the thesis on the instinctive origin of language, a paradox 
presents itself: how does one, positioned within consciousness, prove that 
which is beyond or outside the realm of consciousness? Nietzsche adopts 
a negative approach to demonstrate the impossibility of attributing the 
origin of language to the domain of consciousness, whether this is an 
anribute of the individua l or the group. In the case of the individual, 
language is too 'complex' a phenomenon - and by this Nietzsche means 
that language is too sophisticated - to be the product of a solitary 
individual In the case of the group, language is too 'un ified' a 
phenomenon and by this Nietzsche wants to show that the differences of 
opinion between individuals that constitute the group would prevent the 
creation of a language. Since both of these possibilities - the individual 
and the social - take consc iousness as their starting point, and since 
they are unacceptable as explanatory models fo r the origin of language, 
the "only alternative," Nietzsche concludes, is "instinct, like among the 
bees - ,he anthill, e,c." (OL 209; KGW 11 /2, 186) 
Animals and insects conSfanrly re·appear throughout the Nietzschean 
corpus,6 but in 0" Ih, Origill 0/ Longuagt they are used to show that the 
best way to understand what is tru ly human is by analogy with the non-
human, animal world. However, this is not 'on ly' an analogy, but more 
of a destabiljzation of the customary contrast and privileging of the 
human to the animal. Despite the obvious differences between species, 
the common g round that brings humans and animaJs together is that of 
instinct , i.e., thac they are aU subject to instinctive forces. And opposed 
to the category of the instinctive, Nietzsche positS the inorganic, 
inanimate world. It is only by disrupting the lines of demarcation 
between the human and the animal that the traditional privilege of 
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humanity as the 'master' of the world, hierarchicalJy situated above the 
animal world, can be displaced, 
Classifying the human and the animal within the category of the 
instinctive is elaborated upon at the end of 011 the Oright 0/ Langllage 
where Nietzsche approves of Schelling who writes, "language's situation 
is like that of organic beings; we be lieve we see them originating blindly 
and yet we cannot deny the unfathomable intentionality of their 
formation down to every detail."(OL 211; KGW 11/2, 18Sf All animate 
and therefore instinctive beings are 'blind' because they do nOt plan or 
intend their evolution and yet their development seems so goal-oriented 
that it is impossible not to admit to some kind of"intentionality,H But 
the evolution of nature and language do not follow any intentionality, for 
intentions presuppose consciousness or a conscious being that had such 
intentions, a presupposition that cannOt be assumed, This is why the 
origin of language lies 'beneath' the su rface of consciousness, making it 
~ unfathomable. H For Schelling, "the deeper we penetrate in it, the more 
definitely we discover that its depth far exceeds that of the most 
conscious product.'" Consciousness is designated in a secondary and 
inferior position to instinct, 
BlIt while ' instinct' is offered as fhe definitive answer to the riddle of 
the origin of language, it, in turn, is transformed into another riddle for 
'instinct' represents that which functions as though it were conscious bur 
which lies beyond conscious explanations, It is in this respect that we find 
Nietzsche enthusiastically repeating Kant's fascination with nature as 
displaying the "remarkable paradox that something can be pu rposeful 
without a consciousness ," (Ot 21 1; KGW 1I/2, 188) If the purpose of 
language is that of communication, then one is justified in expecting 
some form of consciousness as having created this instrumem for 
communication, But this is an unwarranted expectation: the riddle of 
instinct, the riddle of how it evolved into a mechanism allowing for 
human communication, is precisely that it is inexplicable, Within the 
history of philosophy consciousness had been established as the privileged 
term in the conscious-instinct opposition, Nietzsche inverts this 
opposition relocating the causal origins of language in the realm of 
instinct, while the effect of this realm - language· use - is located in 
the sphere of consciousness,' 
Saussure would later describe this as the "faculty" of Innguage, the 
faculty that humans are born with, and underlying both Inngut and 
parolt. 10 The shift from the natural origin oflanguage to its actualisation 
as a medium of communication is made possible, according to Herder, 
with the use of exclamations: he had argued that "exclamation" is the 
"mother" of language since the externalised sounds produced during 
exclamations at a particulnr moment in time can be internalised and 
used in other situations, at other moments in time. Nietzsche rejccu this 
arguing that it is negation that makes communication possible: the 
possibility of negation opens up the space for the possibility of 
affirmation. It is the binary values of 'yes' and 'no' that mark the 
inaugural moment of the social dimension of language as an instrument 
for communication. In The Gay Scitnre Nietzsche develops this account 
equating the origin of consciousness with the origin of language, and 
specifically with the need to communicate. (GS §354) 
Culture and Communication 
Nietzsche's search for the origin of language is insrructive as it provides 
him with a framework with which to conduct an analysis of culture. The 
discovery of language as a product of nature is transformed into a 
scathing critique of the state of sOMcalled "advanced" culture . Thus while 
Janguage is established as the naturallYMgiven predisposition of the 
human species, the way it is used (or misused) is internally connected to 
the way a culture appropriates it to suit specific purposes. It is generally 
assumed that the achievements of a cui cure parallel the sophistication or 
the language used in that culture. But while this might seem to be a 
positive step, Nietzsche interrogates the assumption that the 
achievements of culture are necessarily an improvement . In a linguistic 
version of'golden age' theories, Nietzsche laments the "fall " of language 
from its natural and 'perfect' origins to an "imperfect" state of cultural 
sophistication. The feature that justifies Nietzsche's critique of cu lture is 
the misuseoflinguistic communication, a misuse that alienates man from 
his own nature and from others. On his analysis, the relation between 
language and culture is inversely proportional such that progress in the 
latter is a sign of deterioration in (he former. Underlying the discourse of 
nature versus cu lture are the values of the pure and the impure, and in 
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Olllbt Origin o/wngllagt the 'purity' of nature is valorised over and above 
the 'impurity' of culture. What this va1orisation amountS to is, in effect, 
an implicit call for a return to a more natural way of life. 
What would this natural way of Me entail? And what are the grounds 
for Nietzsche's claim that linguistic communication is a symptOm of 
human alienation from each other? The scarting point is the assumption 
that it is language that defines humans and which, as a result, makes 
possible forms of thinking that arc nOt strictly connected to their 
survival: "it is absolu tely impossible to have such a clever thought [Ed: 
Jr!Ja/tJ;mm;gtJ Dmkm], for instance, with a language consisting of merely 
animal sounds [bloft IbieriJehen LallIJprachtr (OL 209; KGW 1J/2, 185). 
The "merely animal sounds" refer to {he way animals communicate In 
response to their environment, in acrualising what nature has designated 
for their respective species. On the other hand, Jjnguistic communjc3tion 
enables humans CO have what Nietzsche describes as 'clever thought': the 
meaning of 'clever thought' is implied in its opposition to anima1 forms 
of communication, for while animal communication is governed by the 
need to survive, human linguistic communication can engage in abstract 
speculation. Language therefore marks the boundary between humans 
and animals such that the simplisiey of anima1 sounds is opposed to 
abstract, rational ising processes. 
The paradox of language is that. while it is language that makes 
"clever thought" possible, this development is detrimental both to 
language itself as the mediwn for communication and, by implication, to 
humanity as a species, since it is language thac defines the species nature 
of humans in the first place. The deterioration of the French language is 
a case in point: accotding to Nietzsche, the subtle distinctions and 
Styliseic devices that characterised French - declensions, neuter, 
passives, fina l or stem-syllables - have been eradicated with [he 
development of 'clever thought·: "A more highly developed culture IS 
even incapable of preserving from decay what was handed down to it 
complete." (Ibid.) 
But why does this "decay" occur? Why is language cransformed from 
a state of completion to one of decay? The cause of this transformation 
is the misuse of linguistic communication and Nietzsche understands 
misuse as a failure ro use language according to the purpose chat nature 
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had designated it for. On this essentiaJist acCOUnt, [here is a connection 
between the origin oflanguage and its purpose, a connection that is best 
described in his 1876 essay, Richard Wag1ltr in 8ayrttllh: 
First of all he [Wagner) recognised a Stale of distress extending as far as 
Civilisation now unites narions: everywhere langNage IS sick, and rhe 
oppression of this tremendow sickness weighs on the whole of human 
devdopment. Inasmuch as language has had continually to climb up to 
the highest rung of achievemem possible to it so as to encompass the 
realm of thought - a realm diametrically opposed to that for the 
expression of which it was originally supremdy adapted, namely the 
realm of Strong feelings - it has du ring the brief period of 
contemporary civilisation become exhausted through this excessivecffort: 
so that now it is not longer capable of perform ing that function for the 
sake of which alone it exisu: to enable suffering mankind to come to an 
understanding with onc another over the simplest needs of life. (RW §5) 
The use and misuse oflanguage is grounded in Nietzsche's distinction 
between (he proper use of language CO communicate feelings, and the 
misuse of language to communicate "thought"11 In the proper use of 
language, the (origin and the goal coincide with the resu lt that humanity 
is one with its own nature; with the imprope r use of language, the failure 
to fulfil its purpose leads to alienation between members of the 
community. 
Critical Remarks 
Nietzsche's critique of cultu re from a linguistic perspective sufTers from 
a number of difficulties. For a start it would seem that Nietzsche valorises 
"clever thought" [Ed: shnrftinlligtl Den/un (KGW 11/2, 185)] as that 
which - through the medium of language - differentiates humans 
from other animals. On this account, language and "clever thought" go 
hand in hand in categorising humans by defining and positioning them 
in the natural order of things. But having ident ified the usc oflanguage 
and "clever thought" as the defining feature of humanity, Nietzsche then 
goes on to claim that when language is used in this way, humanity loses 
contact with irs own naturc. 
In addit ion, if philosophical thought- and presumably philosophical 
thought can be subsumed under "clever thought" [Ed: shnrfsullliges 
Denk",) - is a symptom of the deterioration of a culture, then 
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Nietzsche's own text contributes to the furthering of this dererioration. 
Given his assertion that philosophical thought is inescapably bound to 
language, Nietzsche's crit ical interrogation of cultu re entails the 
performative contradiction of doing precise ly what he is arguing against; 
to justify the critiq ue of culturc, he would have to adopt a position 
situated beyond language and thought. a pos ition that is impossible to 
aWlin. In effect, Nietzsche's text is a furthering of the decadence that he 
denounces, and t his failure to realise the implicat ions of his own 
arg ument is also apparent with the way he postu lates the opposition 
between the proper use oflanguagc (as the natu ral expression offeelings) 
and the improper use of language (for the communication of "clever 
thoughr"). If the whole point of the p:t(5er is to argue for the return to the 
proper use of language to express one's emotions, then it seems odd that 
the opening lines of the paper suggest that the only way co understand 
[he origin of language is throug h the use of a riddle which, of irs nature, 
belongs to the category of "clever thought." 
Although 011 The Orlgill 0/ Ltmgllage opens with a riddle, it does nOt, 
as is customary, solve the riddle. Or rather, the text ends by producing 
more riddles fo r, having discovered that language can be explained as the 
fundamental attribute of human natj.lre, it is chis very attribute that is 
the very cause of humanity's impoverishment. The alienation of 
humanity from its own nature takes place through the formation of a 
type of cultural life that values the use of abstract thought. Despite the 
marvel that Nietzsche displays cowards the human instinct of language, 
the underlying and recurring motif is the misuse of language as the root 
cause of humanity'S decline. Language presents us nOt only with a riddle 
but pe rh aps, with the greateSt of all riddles, for the paradox at the heart 
of humanity is that that which conStitutes the possibility for its greatness 
is identical to that which contributes ro its diminurion. I have argued 
that Nietzsche's attempt co differentiate between rhe 'pu re; natural, 
origin of language and its 'impure,' conventional use undermines his own 
position chat favoured the former. By the time of the essay, On Trllih and 
Lie in all EXira-Moral Seme, Nieczsche realised the impasse his views 
generated and soon abandoned them. This might explain why the 
discussion on instinctive origin of language is downplayed, while the 
conventional and arbitrary nature of language takes on a more pivotal 
role. 
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